Tuesday, May 7, 2024

It’s Time To Amend How We Amend The Constitution: Legal Scholars Call For Limited Constitutional Convention - Yale Journal on Regulation

It’s Time To Amend How We Amend The Constitution: Legal Scholars Call For Limited Constitutional Convention - Yale Journal on Regulation  April 22, 2024

Our Constitution is not and never was perfect. The Framers intended for it to undergo amendment as required to maintain the spirit of the Revolution and to prevent the recurrence of the weaknesses that saddled our government under the Articles of Confederation. Yet, amending the Constitution has become nearly impossible in our current political environment. Our “frozen” Constitution now ranks among the most difficult to alter the world over.

This status quo cannot persist if our constitutional order is going to withstand threats to its core principles–such as federalism, the separation of powers, and the sovereignty of the people–arising from modern developments. Built-up pressure to amend the Constitution has stressed other political institutions and actors: Congress arguably delegates too much of its legislative power to agencies–power that is then exercised with insufficient oversight; successive presidential administrations have increasingly turned to executive orders to fill in legislative gaps better suited for congressional attention; and the Supreme Court has swung from narrowly interpreting the Constitution to effectively amending it via pathbreaking decisions.

The undersigned call for a Constitutional Convention with a single agenda item: amending how we amend our Constitution.

This Convention would align with a well-defined pattern of Americans substantively amending the Constitution upon substantial and unanticipated changes to social, economic, and political conditions. Two examples of this pattern stand out. Following the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments updated the Constitution to expand our political community and afford greater legal protections. And, then, in the wake of the Gilded Age, the Progressive Movement ushered in a series of amendments to again enlarge our electorate, increase the government’s capacity to solve contemporary problems, and provide greater means of political accountability.

Though a hodge-podge of amendments have since been ratified, a decades-long failure to update the Constitution for modern realities has generated a substantial amount of “constitutional debt.” Akin to the sort of “tech debt” that occurs when computer engineers speedily fix an issue that will later require a more effective and resource-intensive solution, constitutional debt is the sum of poor attempts to address issues better suited for amendment.

Constitutional alterations via judicial decisions contribute to that debt. State and federal actors expanding their powers to their constitutional limits (if not further) further add to that debt. We the People taking anti-constitutional actions that undermine our political order also pile on to that debt.

Push has come to shove. We can no longer delay amending our Constitution to account for realities that do not comport with the assumptions underlying its original design. Here’s a short list of some out-of-date assumptions.

One, a system that appropriately balances the power wielded by small and large states. By 2040, when 70 percent of our population resides in the fifteen most populous states, that will surely no longer be the case.

Second, a system in which elected officials regard themselves as accountable to the whole of their community. Given our current electoral system, Senators and Representatives alike have far more interest in appealing to members of their respective parties and their donors more so than their community at large.

And, third, a system in which individuals identify with and advocate for their states. The nationalization of our news, among many other factors, has rendered this assumption quite inaccurate.

Advances in AI, changes brought on by climate change, and worsening income inequality all threaten to further distinguish our contemporary society from the society anticipated by our current Constitution.

This group of scholars pledges not to idly stand by during this critical moment. As academics, we are privileged and obligated to identify solutions to pressing problems. You can expect this group to release various proposals related to keeping our constitutional order running amid novel and complex problems. In particular, members of this group plan to release proposals for how to amend Article V, which contains the current means to amend the Constitution. We hope these proposals elicit widespread analysis. But for this conversation to really take off, we need a wide range of diverse stakeholders to lend their voices to this important and overdue conversation.

We do not think that adjustments to our constitutional order should come exclusively through this process. There are other means to catch up on our constitutional debt. For instance, we can and should explore means to increase civic education, pass legislation that safeguards access to the polls, and support local news. The severity and numerosity of threats facing our constitutional order merit exploration of all these strategies.

The administrative state is one area particularly ripe for an overhaul. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a compromise measure enacted in 1946, no longer furthers the values–accountability, transparency, and public participation–that fueled its passage. Decades of judge-made additions to the APA have further muddled the procedural obligations of agencies. And, yet, agencies have become responsible for an ever-increasing portion of our legal order–thousands of regulations are promulgated per year whereas Congress struggles to pass any legislation of substance.

This problematic state of affairs is all the more troubling given the Supreme Court will soon introduce even more uncertainty into the administrative state. Court observers anticipate that the Justices will dislodge a decades-old precedent upon which much of agency action has been authorized and legitimized. Regulation of AI, climate change, and other pressing challenges necessitates getting this core part of our governing system in order. Specifically, as our regulatory challenges become more scientifically and technologically complex it will be all the more important to know with some predictability the extent to which courts will defer to agency actions and interpretations.

Even if overdue fixes to the administrative state are finally made, some adjustments to our constitutional order should only come via amendment and, for those changes to occur, we will need to amend Article V. The Constitution was meant to empower the people to act as the ultimate sovereigns. Yet, many people rightfully feel that the Constitution limits our authority more so than protecting it. That’s a recipe for constitutional disorder–an outcome we must avoid.

Sincerely,

Kevin Frazier
Assistant Professor of Law
St. Thomas University College of Law

Lawrence Lessig
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership
Harvard Law School

And dozens more

Monday, May 6, 2024

Resurrecting the Equal Protection Clause Through the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 by Thomas Nielsen :: SSRN

Resurrecting the Equal Protection Clause Through the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 by Thomas Nielsen :: SSRN

Resurrecting the Equal Protection Clause Through the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871

21 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2024

Thomas Nielsen

Harvard University, Harvard Law School

Date Written: April 15, 2024

Abstract

In 1998, Justice Scalia defended the Supreme Court’s notoriously ahistorical approach to qualified immunity on the grounds that it was a corrective to the Court’s similarly ahistorical approach to interpreting § 1983 itself, as embodied in Monroe v. Pape. In more recent years, Justice Thomas has similarly floated the idea that the Court’s understanding of § 1983 is incorrect, and that whatever the Court does with qualified immunity should be accompanied by a reevaluation of Monroe. As the Court careens towards a wholesale reevaluation of its civil rights jurisprudence, this Essay seeks to put on the brakes, using the enactment debates of the Klan Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to provide historical evidence that the notion of “equal protection” was, in important respects, significantly broader than the Supreme Court has understood it.

This Essay first argues that the Equal Protection Clause was understood by its framers to remedy (1) discriminatory state laws; (2) discriminatory enforcement of neutral laws; and (3) private acts of racial violence that were not prosecuted by state authorities. It then considers three Klan Act provisions that are still in effect and uses the enactment debates during the Forty-Second Congress to show how each of these provisions sought to implement the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantees. The Essay first hypothesizes that Section 1 of the Klan Act –– what is now § 1983 –– was passed, inter alia, to remedy racially discriminatory state laws, as well as racially discriminatory enforcement of neutral laws by state officers. It then looks to Sections 2 and 6 of the Klan Act, which contained a damages action for private civil conspiracy and negligence in knowing about the existence of such a conspiracy and permitting it to occur, respectively. The Essay hypothesizes that these provisions worked together to allow recovery against private perpetrators of hate crimes in situations where states refused to enforce their own laws. In each section, the Essay addresses potential issues squaring the historical framework with more recent caselaw (especially involving the state action doctrine) and concludes that very little stands in the way of implementing it. Finally, using incarcerated individuals as a case study, the Essay explains how the historical framework might be useful to modern civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys bringing civil rights claims before originalist judges.

Keywords: civil rights law, constitutional law, statutory interpretation, prison litigation, civil rights litigation, section 1983, state action, reconstruction originalism, originalism

Nielsen, Thomas, Resurrecting the Equal Protection Clause Through the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (April 15, 2024). Texas Journal on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4794913

Thursday, May 2, 2024

Andrew Koppelman: The Supreme Court’s Gay Rights-Religious Liberty Contortions

The Supreme Court’s Gay Rights-Religious Liberty Contortions

33 PagesPosted: 23 Mar 2024

Date Written: March 21, 2024

Abstract

The Supreme Court has heard several cases in which conservative religious claimants objected to antidiscrimination laws requiring them to provide services to LGBT people. Each time it has disposed of the case in a way that let the religious claimant win, but established no clear doctrine. The Court misconstrued the record or misrepresented the challenged state law or both, and invented new doctrinal rules so extreme or obscure that they cannot possibly be applied consistently by lower courts. The pattern appears in four cases: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Fulton v. Philadelphia, and 303 Creative v. Elenis. A fifth, Scardina v. Masterpiece, seems likely to repeat it. I describe the pattern and propose an explanation, arising from two difficulties characteristic of religious exemption cases: courts must worry about opening the floodgates to so many claims that the underlying statute’s purposes will be defeated, and courts have no legal basis for determining what is or is not a compelling interest.

Keywords: religious liberty, gay rights, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Fulton v. Philadelphia, 303 Creative v. Elenis, Scardina v. Masterpiece

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Wednesday, May 1, 2024

Segall: The Roberts court: rule of lawlessness : Dorf on Law

https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2024/05/the-roberts-court-and-rule-of.html?s=09

D.C. Bar counsel: Disbar Jeffrey Clark

Donald Trump, after A.G. Barr quit, installed Jeffrey Clark who collaborated in Trump’s effort to hold on to power despite losing the election.  Today the D.C. Bar's Disciplinary Counsel  recommended disbarment: 

From the disciplinary counsel’s proposed finding of fact and conclusions:

It is not enough that the efforts of these lawyers ultimately failed. As a profession, we must do what we can to ensure that this conduct is never repeated. The way to accomplish that goal is to remove from the profession lawyers who betrayed their constitutional obligations and their country. It is important that other lawyers who might be tempted to engage in similar misconduct be aware that doing so will cost them their privilege to practice law. It is also important for the courts and the legal profession to state clearly that the ends do not justify the means; that process matters; and that this is a society of laws, not men.

Tuesday, April 30, 2024

Dov Waxman - Israel -Gaza -How to proceed

Dov Waxman of UCLA explains why, as a long time supporter of Palestinian rights, he cannot join today's campus encampments.
https://twitter.com/DovWaxman/status/1784372085374288137?t=w-ElDimCwhhzG8RLrL-jyg&s=19

Monday, April 22, 2024

Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant. 18 U.S.C. 1512

 

18 USC 1512(c)(2)

 

(c)Whoever corruptly—

(1)

alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

 Attorney Kenneth Chesebro pled guilty to submitting a fake slate of presidential electors.  Now Johnson faces the same array of charges.

Thursday, April 18, 2024

"In Pursuit of Meaningful Civil Representation: Advocacy Strategy Propo" by Sophia T. Slater

"In Pursuit of Meaningful Civil Representation: Advocacy Strategy Propo" by Sophia T. Slater
Fordham Urban Law Journal
By Sophia T. Slater, Published on 04/01/24

INTRODUCTION “If we had had representation at the beginning, the eviction probably would not have happened.”1 Cristina Quiñones-Betancourt, a nonprofit attorney from the organization Mobilization for Justice, made this remark about a client who had been evicted after missing rent payments and was seeking to get back his apartment.2 Although Quiñones-Betancourt had a legal argument that her client’s Section 8 housing voucher should have counted toward the outstanding rent, an evicted person with a nonprofit legal attorney bearing an unmanageable caseload has an uphill battle squaring off with a well-represented landlord.3 The Legal Aid Society’s Chief Attorney of the Civil Practice, Adriene Holder, said the mechanism of legal aid is “extremely successful” when implemented, but explained the organization is “still turning away thousands of people because of the lack of capacity.”4 This situation in housing court is just one consequence of the general lack of a right to counsel for civil cases in the United States, which is producing progressively more dire outcomes. The impact of this lack of civil counsel is particularly disparate for those facing financial and racial barriers to legal assistance.5

 IN PURSUIT OF MEANINGFUL CIVIL REPRESENTATION: ADVOCACY STRATEGY PROPOSALS FOR AN INTEGRATED CIVIL GIDEON AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT APPROACH Sophia T. Slater* Introduction ....................................................................................1274 
I. Factual Background .................................................................1276 
A. The Access to Civil Justice Crisis................................1276 
B. The Civil Right to Counsel (Or Lack Thereof) ............1277 
II. Existing Approaches ................................................................1278 
A. The Civil Gideon Approach .........................................1279 
B. The Legal Empowerment Approach ............................1281 
1. Upsolve, Inc. et al. v. James ...................................1282 2
. The Discriminatory Nature of Professional Regulation in the Practice of Law...........................1284 
III. Proposed Advocacy Strategies.................................................1286 
A. Litigation Strategy for a Civil Right to Counsel Based on the Right to a Jury Trial for Deportable Offenses...1286
 1. The Legal Standard of a Sufficiently Severe Penalty ....................................................................1287 2. Padilla v. Kentucky.................................................1289 
3. Right to a Jury Trial in Proceedings for Deportable Offenses..................................................................1290
i. Bado v. United States.......................................1291 
ii. People v. Suazo ................................................1293 
4. Applications to a Civil Right to Counsel................1295 
B. Gun Violence Intervention Program as a Model for Legal Empowerment Initiatives..............................................1296 
1. The Jacobi Medical Center’s SUV Program...........1297 
2. Applications to a Legal Empowerment Initiative ...1299 C. Why Both Approaches Must be Implemented Together........................................................................1302 Conclusion......................................................................................1303

Tuesday, April 16, 2024

Toward a New Constitutional Politics - LPE Project

Toward a New Constitutional Politics - LPE Project
By Aziz Rana (New York)

In recent years, the anti-democratic flaws of the U.S. Constitution have become increasingly apparent. Commentators now routinely worry over the system’s exaggerated checks on popular authority: the lopsided grant of power to certain states, an impassable constitutional amendment process, widespread voter disenfranchisement, and of course the dramatic control exercised by a tiny group of lifetime federal judges.

And yet, if you grew up in the United States around the turn of the twenty-first century, the dominant culture was that of almost religious textual devotion. Even Occupy Wall Street was launched on Constitution Day, September 17. One might well have assumed that the American constitutional system stood at the apex of liberal-democratic ideas. Given its manifest flaws, how did Americans come to idolize this document and what have been the political consequences of this reverence?

My new book, The Constitutional Bind, attempts to make sense of this striking tension in our collective life. It argues that the substance and implications of modern constitutional veneration have not been continuous since the founding. They are, instead, a distinctively twentieth century development. Over the past century, the text became constitutively joined to what Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in 1944 famously labeled the “American creed”—the idea that the U.S. stands for the promise of equal liberty for all. Such creedal constitutionalism was then further augmented by a series of additional commitments: civil libertarian values, market capitalism, constrained representative government with an empowered Supreme Court, and—crucially—the belief that these principles explained why the U.S. should direct the global order.

The Supreme Court wants to hand a victory to January 6 insurrectionists - Vox

Hostage


The Supreme Court wants to hand a victory to January 6 insurrectionists - Vox
By Ian Millhiser

The Supreme Court spent about an hour and a half on Tuesday morning arguing over whether to make it much harder for the Justice Department to prosecute hundreds of people who joined the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol.

It appears, after Tuesday’s arguments, that a majority of the justices will side with the insurrectionists — though it is far from clear how those justices will justify such an outcome.

The case, known as Fischer v. United States, involved a federal law which provides that anyone who “obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so” commits a very serious federal felony and can be imprisoned for up to 20 years — although, as Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar pointed out during Tuesday’s argument, actual sentences against January 6 defendants convicted under this statute have been much shorter, normally ranging from a little less than one year to slightly over two years.

According to the Justice Department, more than 1,265 people have been arrested for playing some role in the attack on the Capitol. Approximately 330 of them have been charged under the obstruction statute at issue in FischerOne of them is Donald Trump.

As a federal appeals court held in its decision in this case, the obstruction statute is pretty darn clear that it applies to an effort to obstruct any congressional proceeding intended to certify the result of a presidential election — like the proceeding that the January 6 rioters attacked. And very few of the justices seemed to agree with Jeffrey Green, the lawyer representing a January 6 defendant, who proposed one way to read the statute more narrowly.

Nevertheless, many of the justices expressed concerns that the law sweeps too broadly and that it must be narrowed to prevent people who engage in relatively benign activity from being prosecuted.

Justice Samuel Alito, for example, expressed uncharacteristic sympathy for hecklers who interrupt a Supreme Court hearing — suggesting that prosecuting them under a statute that can carry a 20-year sentence goes too far. Justice Neil Gorsuch expressed similar concerns about prosecuting someone who peacefully conducts a sit-in to delay a court hearing, or someone who pulls a fire alarm to disrupt an official proceeding.

Monday, April 15, 2024

NY State Bar Report on AI - Artificial Intelligence use



“The New York State Bar Association has adopted guidelines for lawyers to use artificial intelligence without running afoul of attorney ethics rules, as organizations and courts continue to weigh the benefits and pitfalls of AI in the legal sector. Lawyers should take precautions to safeguard sensitive client information and protect confidentiality, and should not rely solely on information generated by AI and generative AI tools in client matters, a state bar AI task force urged in a new Report and Recommendations of the New York State Bar Association Task Force on Artificial Intelligence.” Read more comment by Reuters here.

Ten Recommendations by the New York State Bar Association Task force on AI:

Task Force Recommendations 

1. Adopt Guidelines: The Task Force recommends that NYSBA adopt the AI/Generative AI guidelines outlined in this report and commission a standing section or committee to oversee periodic updates to those guidelines. 

2. Focus on Education: The Task Force recommends that NYSBA prioritize education in addition to legislation, focusing on educating judges, lawyers, law students and regulators to understand the technology so that they can apply existing law to regulate it. 

3. Identify Risks for New Regulation: Legislatures and regulators should identify risks associated with the technology that are not addressed by existing laws, which will likely involve extensive hearings and studies involving experts in AI, and as needed, adopt regulations and legislation to address those risks. 

4. Examine the Function of the Law in AI Governance: The rapid advancement of AI prompts us to examine the function of the law as a governance tool. Some of the key functions of Page 10 of 85 the law in the AI context are: (i) expressing social values and reinforcing fundamental principles; (ii) protecting against risks to such values and principles; and (iii) stabilizing society and increasing legal certainty.

Toward a New Constitutional Politics - Aziz Rana - LPE Project

The treatment of the Constitution as scripture is a disabling feature in our law and politics.  Especially because the scripture is limited to the 1787 pre-industrial revolution first draft which sought to guarantee the disproportionate power of the slavers like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, 
No one speaks of the drafters of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments as founders.
- GWC
Toward a New Constitutional Politics - LPE Project
By Aziz Rana [Professor of law and government at Boston College.]

In recent years, the anti-democratic flaws of the U.S. Constitution have become increasingly apparent. Commentators now routinely worry over the system’s exaggerated checks on popular authority: the lopsided grant of power to certain states, an impassable constitutional amendment process, widespread voter disenfranchisement, and of course the dramatic control exercised by a tiny group of lifetime federal judges.

And yet, if you grew up in the United States around the turn of the twenty-first century, the dominant culture was that of almost religious textual devotion. Even Occupy Wall Street was launched on Constitution Day, September 17. One might well have assumed that the American constitutional system stood at the apex of liberal-democratic ideas. Given its manifest flaws, how did Americans come to idolize this document and what have been the political consequences of this reverence?

My new book, The Constitutional Bind, attempts to make sense of this striking tension in our collective life. It argues that the substance and implications of modern constitutional veneration have not been continuous since the founding. They are, instead, a distinctively twentieth century development. 

Sunday, April 14, 2024

The Indian Ocean Slave Trade - with Prof. Bernard Freamon

 Bernard Freamon is author of Possessed by the Right Hand - a history to the present day of Islam and Slavery.



Stormy Daniels Trump trial: Why the legal arguments are stronger than I thought. by Mark Joseph Stern - SLATE


The elements of the offense with which Trump is  charged - falsification of business records are HERE.
Stormy Daniels Trump trial: Why the legal arguments are stronger than I thought.
By Michael Joseph Stern - SLATE

When Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg brought criminal charges against Donald Trump in 2023, I was highly skeptical of his decision. It seemed at the time that other indictments would soon follow, and that they would rest on far firmer legal ground than this one. Over the past year, though, I have realized that my initial doubts about Bragg’s indictment were misplaced. It now seems clear that Trump’s New York trial, slated to begin this week, will be the former president’s only criminal trial before the November election. 
The other three strong indictments against him in other jurisdictions have unfortunately been delayed by a corrupt judge, a foot-dragging Supreme Court, and a district attorney’s questionable conduct in an already complex case. This, combined with Bragg’s excellent pretrial briefing, has substantially strengthened the case for this prosecution. It is important to American democracy that Trump be forced to defend at least some of his alleged criminal conduct before a jury of his peers in advance of Election Day. And there is no reason why this shouldn’t be the case in which he’s compelled to do it. I am now fully onboard.

Saturday, April 13, 2024

The NY Trump prosecution.- elements of the offense

 

A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.

 New York Consolidated Laws, Penal Law - PEN § 175.10 Falsifying business records in the first degree

A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.

Falsifying business records in the first degree is a class E felony.


Tuesday, April 9, 2024

Trump is Not Immune from Prosecution - Jack Smith - Special Counsel




 

The United States Supreme Court will soon hear argument in a case in which it has granted a petition for review pre-trial.  Case, No. 23-393 is United States v. Donald J., Trump, prosecution  for charges arising from his role in the attempted obstruction of the lawful transfer of power after he lost the 2020 Presidential election.

On February 6, 2024, in his application to the Supreme Court for a stay of trial, posed two questions for the Court:

The questions presented are: I. Whether the doctrine of absolute presidential immunity includes immunity from criminal prosecution for a President’s official acts, i.e., those performed within the “‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)). II. Whether the Impeachment Judgment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7, and principles of double jeopardy foreclose the criminal prosecution of a President who has been impeached and acquitted by the U.S. Senate for the same and/or closely related conduct that underlies the criminal charges. 

The Court granted the stay but reframed the questions  presented as:

Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

In his Brief for the United States To this the Special Counsel Jack Smith has a plain answer:  

I. A former President lacks immunity from federal criminal prosecution for official acts during his presidency  
A. A claim of absolute criminal immunity for a
former President’s official acts violates
established separation-of-powers principles
B. History supports the conclusion that former
Presidents are subject to prosecution for official
acts.

The Court earlier this year declined a request by Smith to rule quickly on the issue. but the Court ordered that the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals first rule on the issues.  The Court did.  This appeal by Trump followed.  the delay i consequential.  A decision is unlikely until the end of June, making trial and judgment before the November election doubtful.  Should Trump be re-elected he could order dismissal of all charges by the Attorney General whom he appoints.

- GWC 4/11/24


Monday, April 8, 2024

Trump is not immune_DavidBoyle amicus

20240321205032155_23-939_tsac_DavidBoyle.pdf

After Courts: Democratizing Statutory Law by Ryan Doerfler, Samuel Moyn :: SSRN

The latest in a line of articles opposing judicial aggrandizement, the imperial judiciary, etc..
- GWC
 
After Courts: Democratizing Statutory Law

70 Pages Posted:

Ryan Doerfler

Harvard Law School

Samuel Moyn

Yale University

Date Written: April 7, 2024

Abstract

In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued for locating interpretive authority over law separately from those institutions tasked with formulating it. Hamilton’s vision, never accurate as a description of American practice, has not been credible for a long time. To the extent massive power is still allocated to judges, our legal institutions have been out of step with our legal theory, which has long regarded them as political actors and policymakers. More practically, every Term it is clearer and clearer that the role of the Supreme Court in statutory cases (including checking administrative rule-making and other processes) is, if anything, more menacing than its role in the rare instances when it deploys its heaviest weaponry of constitutional invalidation. Against progressive calls to reclaim the judiciary, this Article completes our proposal to disempower courts exercising lawmaking authority—including when they are interpreting statutes alone. Indeed, the same considerations that counsel the constitutional disempowerment of courts counsel their statutory disempowerment, and the allocation or reallocation of their authority over law to politically accountable agents. The heart of our Article offers a survey of court disempowerment strategies and tools, which are comparable to though not identical with the disempowerment mechanisms that have been proposed in the arena of constitutional reform. Such strategies and tools are appealing in the short term; but in the long term, a fuller rethinking our desirable institutional plan of legal interpretation beckons. Available and existing disempowerment strategies for courts are best conceived as early and partial versions of full-scale allocation of interpretive authority over law to “political” branches and openly political control.

Doerfler, Ryan and Moyn, Samuel, After Courts: Democratizing Statutory Law (April 7, 2024). Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

History, Tradition, and the Designated Hitter Rule - Eric Segall // Dorf on Law

History, Tradition, and the Designated Hitter Rule // 
By Eric Segall

****Professor Solum, along with Professor Randy Barnett, has also commented on the role of history and tradition in some of the Court's recent cases. These two well-known academic originalists wrote an article titled "Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition." 

Their article begins by saying that "in three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court." Not surprisingly, these two originalists concluded the following about history and tradition (the article is sophisticated and provocative but is not the direct subject of this post, hence the leap to the conclusion):

In this Article, we have argued for an originalist approach to history and tradition. History and tradition are essential elements in the originalist toolkit: no originalist should leave home without them. But originalists should be wary of the use of history and tradition by non-originalists, whether they be Progressive or Conservative Constitutional Pluralists. An originalist embrace of history and tradition that is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the constitutional text would undermine originalism itself and sacrifice the rule of law, the separation of powers, and popular sovereignty on the altar of pragmatism and political expediency. Our message is simple: “Originalists, don’t go there!”

Not only should originalists not go there (a strong version of traditionalism) but no one else should either because a tradition-focused approach to constitutional interpretation provides little guidance to judges and lets them hide their implicit value judgments and ideologies behind centuries of disputed practices, customs, and traditions (or the absence thereof). How long does something have to last to be a tradition? How widespread does the tradition have to be? Is rejection of  practices something judges should take strong notice of when examining the role of history and tradition? What if a long tradition is viewed as pernicious by large segments of minority populations? There are no good answers to any of these questions.

Here is a hypothetical to demonstrate these problems....